This RPC allows the client to retrieve the file system locations
of the confirmed blocks and their undo data, to allow building
efficient indexes outside of Bitcoin Core.
An example usage is described here:
https://github.com/romanz/electrs/issues/308
By using the new RPC, it is possible to build an address-based
index taking ~24GB and a txindex taking ~6GB (as of Dec. 2020).
d8087adc7e [test] IsBlockMutated unit tests (dergoegge)
1ed2c98297 Add transaction_identifier::size to allow Span conversion (dergoegge)
1ec6bbeb8d [validation] Cache merkle root and witness commitment checks (dergoegge)
5bf4f5ba32 [test] Add regression test for #27608 (dergoegge)
49257c0304 [net processing] Don't process mutated blocks (dergoegge)
2d8495e080 [validation] Merkle root malleation should be caught by IsBlockMutated (dergoegge)
66abce1d98 [validation] Introduce IsBlockMutated (dergoegge)
e7669e1343 [refactor] Cleanup merkle root checks (dergoegge)
95bddb930a [validation] Isolate merkle root checks (dergoegge)
Pull request description:
This PR proposes to check for mutated blocks early as a defense-in-depth mitigation against attacks leveraging mutated blocks.
We introduce `IsBlockMutated` which catches all known forms of block malleation and use it to do an early mutation check whenever we receive a `block` message.
We have observed attacks that abused mutated blocks in the past, which could have been prevented by simply not processing mutated blocks (e.g. https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/27608 for which a regression test is included in this PR).
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK d8087adc7e
maflcko:
ACK d8087adc7e🏄
fjahr:
Code review ACK d8087adc7e
sr-gi:
Code review ACK d8087adc7e
Tree-SHA512: 618ff4ea7f168e10f07504d3651290efbb1bb2ab3b838ffff3527c028caf6c52dedad18d04d3dbc627977479710930e200f2dfae18a08f627efe7e64a57e535f
29029df5c7 [doc] v3 signaling in mempool-replacements.md (glozow)
e643ea795e [fuzz] v3 transactions and sigop-adjusted vsize (glozow)
1fd16b5c62 [functional test] v3 transaction submission (glozow)
27c8786ba9 test framework: Add and use option for tx-version in MiniWallet methods (MarcoFalke)
9a1fea55b2 [policy/validation] allow v3 transactions with certain restrictions (glozow)
eb8d5a2e7d [policy] add v3 policy rules (glozow)
9a29d470fb [rpc] return full string for package_msg and package-error (glozow)
158623b8e0 [refactor] change Workspace::m_conflicts and adjacent funcs/structs to use Txid (glozow)
Pull request description:
See #27463 for overall package relay tracking.
Delving Bitcoin discussion thread: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/v3-transaction-policy-for-anti-pinning/340
Delving Bitcoin discussion for LN usage: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/lightning-transactions-with-v3-and-ephemeral-anchors/418
Rationale:
- There are various pinning problems with RBF and our general ancestor/descendant limits. These policies help mitigate many pinning attacks and make package RBF feasible (see #28984 which implements package RBF on top of this). I would focus the most here on Rule 3 pinning. [1][2]
- Switching to a cluster-based mempool (see #27677 and #28676) requires the removal of CPFP carve out, which applications depend on. V3 + package RBF + ephemeral anchors + 1-parent-1-child package relay provides an intermediate solution.
V3 policy is for "Priority Transactions." [3][4] It allows users to opt in to more restrictive topological limits for shared transactions, in exchange for the more robust fee-bumping abilities that offers. Even though we don't have cluster limits, we are able to treat these transactions as having as having a maximum cluster size of 2.
Immediate benefits:
- You can presign a transaction with 0 fees (not just 1sat/vB!) and add a fee-bump later.
- Rule 3 pinning is reduced by a significant amount, since the attacker can only attach a maximum of 1000vB to your shared transaction.
This also enables some other cool things (again see #27463 for overall roadmap):
- Ephemeral Anchors
- Package RBF for these 1-parent-1-child packages. That means e.g. a commitment tx + child can replace another commitment tx using the child's fees.
- We can transition to a "single anchor" universe without worrying about package limit pinning. So current users of CPFP carve out would have something else to use.
- We can switch to a cluster-based mempool [5] (#27677#28676), which removes CPFP carve out [6].
[1]: Original mailing list post and discussion about RBF pinning problems https://gist.github.com/glozow/25d9662c52453bd08b4b4b1d3783b9ff, https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-January/019817.html
[2]: A FAQ is "we need this for cluster mempool, but is this still necessary afterwards?" There are some pinning issues that are fixed here and not fully fixed in cluster mempool, so we will still want this or something similar afterward.
[3]: Mailing list post for v3 https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-September/020937.html
[4]: Original PR #25038 also contains a lot of the discussion
[5]: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/an-overview-of-the-cluster-mempool-proposal/393/7
[6]: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/an-overview-of-the-cluster-mempool-proposal/393#the-cpfp-carveout-rule-can-no-longer-be-supported-12
ACKs for top commit:
sdaftuar:
ACK 29029df5c7
achow101:
ACK 29029df5c7
instagibbs:
ACK 29029df5c7 modulo that
Tree-SHA512: 9664b078890cfdca2a146439f8835c9d9ab483f43b30af8c7cd6962f09aa557fb1ce7689d5e130a2ec142235dbc8f21213881baa75241c5881660f9008d68450
When initiating a v2 connection and being immediately disconnected,
a node cannot know if the disconnect happens because the peer only
supports v1, or because it has banned you, so it schedules to reconnect with v1.
If the test doesn't wait for that, the reconnect can happen at a bad time,
resulting in failure in a later connect_nodes call.
Also add the test with --v2transport to the test runner.
bc9283c441 [test] Add functional test to test early key response behaviour in BIP 324 (stratospher)
ffe6a56d75 [test] Check whether v2 TestNode performs downgrading (stratospher)
ba737358a3 [test] Add functional tests to test v2 P2P behaviour (stratospher)
4115cf9956 [test] Ignore BIP324 decoy messages (stratospher)
8c054aa04d [test] Allow inbound and outbound connections supporting v2 P2P protocol (stratospher)
382894c3ac [test] Reconnect using v1 P2P when v2 P2P terminates due to magic byte mismatch (stratospher)
a94e350ac0 [test] Build v2 P2P messages (stratospher)
bb7bffed79 [test] Use lock for sending P2P messages in test framework (stratospher)
5b91fb14ab [test] Read v2 P2P messages (stratospher)
05bddb20f5 [test] Perform initial v2 handshake (stratospher)
a049d1bd08 [test] Introduce EncryptedP2PState object in P2PConnection (stratospher)
b89fa59e71 [test] Construct class to handle v2 P2P protocol functions (stratospher)
8d6c848a48 [test] Move MAGIC_BYTES to messages.py (stratospher)
595ad4b168 [test/crypto] Add ECDH (stratospher)
4487b80517 [rpc/net] Allow v2 p2p support in addconnection (stratospher)
Pull request description:
This PR introduces support for v2 P2P encryption(BIP 324) in the existing functional test framework and adds functional tests for the same.
### commits overview
1. introduces a new class `EncryptedP2PState` to store the keys, functions for performing the initial v2 handshake and encryption/decryption.
3. this class is used by `P2PConnection` in inbound/outbound connections to perform the initial v2 handshake before the v1 version handshake. Only after the initial v2 handshake is performed do application layer P2P messages(version, verack etc..) get exchanged. (in a v2 connection)
- `v2_state` is the object of class `EncryptedP2PState` in `P2PConnection` used to store its keys, session-id etc.
- a node [advertising](https://github.com/stratospher/blogosphere/blob/main/integration_test_bip324.md#advertising-to-support-v2-p2p) support for v2 P2P is different from a node actually [supporting v2 P2P](https://github.com/stratospher/blogosphere/blob/main/integration_test_bip324.md#supporting-v2-p2p) (differ when false advertisement of services occur)
- introduce a boolean variable `supports_v2_p2p` in `P2PConnection` to denote if it supports v2 P2P.
- introduce a boolean variable `advertises_v2_p2p` to denote whether `P2PConnection` which mimics peer behaviour advertises V2 P2P support. Default option is `False`.
- In the test framework, you can create Inbound and Outbound connections to `TestNode`
1. During **Inbound Connections**, `P2PConnection` is the initiator [`TestNode` <--------- `P2PConnection`]
- Case 1:
- if the `TestNode` advertises/signals v2 P2P support (means `self.nodes[i]` set up with `"-v2transport=1"`), different behaviour will be exhibited based on whether:
1. `P2PConnection` supports v2 P2P
2. `P2PConnection` does not support v2 P2P
- In a real world scenario, the initiator node would intrinsically know if they support v2 P2P based on whatever code they choose to run. However, in the test scenario where we mimic peer behaviour, we have no way of knowing if `P2PConnection` should support v2 P2P or not. So `supports_v2_p2p` boolean variable is used as an option to enable support for v2 P2P in `P2PConnection`.
- Since the `TestNode` advertises v2 P2P support (using "-v2transport=1"), our initiator `P2PConnection` would send:
1. (if the `P2PConnection` supports v2 P2P) ellswift + garbage bytes to initiate the connection
2. (if the `P2PConnection` does not support v2 P2P) version message to initiate the connection
- Case 2:
- if the `TestNode` doesn't signal v2 P2P support; `P2PConnection` being the initiator would send version message to initiate a connection.
2. During **Outbound Connections** [TestNode --------> P2PConnection]
- initiator `TestNode` would send:
- (if the `P2PConnection` advertises v2 P2P) ellswift + garbage bytes to initiate the connection
- (if the `P2PConnection` advertises v2 P2P) version message to initiate the connection
- Suppose `P2PConnection` advertises v2 P2P support when it actually doesn't support v2 P2P (false advertisement scenario)
- `TestNode` sends ellswift + garbage bytes
- `P2PConnection` receives but can't process it and disconnects.
- `TestNode` then tries using v1 P2P and sends version message
- `P2PConnection` receives/processes this successfully and they communicate on v1 P2P
4. the encrypted P2P messages follow a different format - 3 byte length + 1-13 byte message_type + payload + 16 byte MAC
5. includes support for testing decoy messages and v2 connection downgrade(using false advertisement - when a v2 node makes an outbound connection to a node which doesn't support v2 but is advertised as v2 by some malicious
intermediary)
### run the tests
* functional test - `test/functional/p2p_v2_encrypted.py` `test/functional/p2p_v2_earlykeyresponse.py`
I'm also super grateful to @ dhruv for his really valuable feedback on this branch.
Also written a more elaborate explanation here - https://github.com/stratospher/blogosphere/blob/main/integration_test_bip324.md
ACKs for top commit:
naumenkogs:
ACK bc9283c441
mzumsande:
Code Review ACK bc9283c441
theStack:
Code-review ACK bc9283c441
glozow:
ACK bc9283c441
Tree-SHA512: 9b54ed27e925e1775e0e0d35e959cdbf2a9a1aab7bcf5d027e66f8b59780bdd0458a7a4311ddc7dd67657a4a2a2cd5034ead75524420d58a83f642a8304c9811
- A node initiates a v2 connection by sending 64 bytes ellswift
- In BIP 324 "The responder waits until one byte is received which does not match the
V1_PREFIX (16 bytes consisting of the network magic followed by "version\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00".)"
- It's possible that the 64 bytes ellswift sent by an initiator starts with a prefix of V1_PREFIX
- Example form of 64 bytes ellswift could be:
4 bytes network magic + 60 bytes which aren't prefixed with remaining V1_PREFIX
- We test this behaviour:
- when responder receives 4 byte network magic -> no response received by initiator
- when first mismatch happens -> response received by initiator
If the serialized transaction passed to `fundrawtransaction` contains
duplicates, they will be deserialized and added to the transaction. Add
a test to ensure this behavior is not changed during the refactor.
A user can pass any number of duplicated and unrelated addresses as an
SFFO argument to `sendmany` and the RPC will not throw an error (note,
all the rest of the RPCs which take SFFO as an argument will error if
the user passes duplicates or specifies outputs not present in the
transaction). Add a test to ensure this behavior is not changed during
the refactor.
df30247705 [test] import descriptor wallet with reorged parent + IsFromMe child in mempool (glozow)
c3d02be536 [test] rescan legacy wallet with reorged parent + IsFromMe child in mempool (Gloria Zhao)
Pull request description:
Originally motivated by #29019, which reverts back to having `requestMempoolTransactions` emit `transactionAddedToMempool` in `mapTx` default order instead of `GetSortedDepthAndScore` order.
It's important that these notifications happen in topological order, otherwise the wallet rescan may miss transactions that belong to it. Notably, checking whether a transaction `IsFromMe` requires knowing its inputs, which may be from a mempool parent.
When using `mapTx` order, a parent may come later than its child if it was added from a block disconnected in a reorg.
This PR adds a test for this case.
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK df30247705
furszy:
Code review ACK df30247705, nits can be disregarded.
Tree-SHA512: 2f1d9ef92313228adbbef94e634e5f7a9ec6e6a2c88e16aa343bdc95ffc9b9f9c82a569b412c9a3841db9d789e52f9283e8b9385731668d59355903e26e58a5d
Test that wallet rescans process transactions topologically, even if a
parent's entry into the mempool is later than that of its child.
This behavior is important because IsFromMe requires the ability to look
up a transaction's inputs.
Co-authored-by: furszy <matiasfurszyfer@protonmail.com>
878d914777 doc: test: mention OS detection preferences in style guideline (Sebastian Falbesoner)
4c65ac96f8 test: detect OS consistently using `platform.system()` (Sebastian Falbesoner)
37324ae3df test: use `skip_if_platform_not_linux` helper where possible (Sebastian Falbesoner)
Pull request description:
There are at least three ways to detect the operating system in Python3:
- `os.name` (https://docs.python.org/3.9/library/os.html#os.name)
- `sys.platform` (https://docs.python.org/3.9/library/sys.html#sys.platform)
- `platform.system()` (https://docs.python.org/3.9/library/platform.html#platform.system)
We are currently using all of them in functional tests (both in individual tests and shared test framework code), which seems a bit messy. This PR consolidates into using `platform.system()`, as it appears to be one most consistent and easy to read (see also [IRC discussion](https://bitcoin-irc.chaincode.com/bitcoin-core-dev/2023-12-08#989301;) and table below). `sys.platform` is inconsistent as it has the major version number encoded for BSD systems, which doesn't make much sense for e.g. OpenBSD, where there is no concept of major versions, but instead the version is simply increased by 0.1 on each release.
Note that `os.name` is still useful to detect whether we are running a POSIX system (see `BitcoinTestFramework.skip_if_platform_not_posix`), so for this use-case it is kept as only exception. The following table shows values for common operating systems, found via
```
$ python3 -c "import os; import sys; import platform; print(os.name, sys.platform, platform.system())"
```
| OS | os.name | sys.platform | platform.system() |
|--------------|---------|--------------|--------------------|
| Linux 6.2.0 | posix | linux | Linux |
| MacOS* | posix | darwin | Darwin |
| OpenBSD 7.4 | posix | openbsd7 | OpenBSD |
| Windows* | nt | win32 | Windows |
\* = I neither have a MacOS nor a Windows machine available, so I extracted the values from documentation and our current code. Also I'm relying on CI for testing the relevant code-paths. Having reviewers to this this locally would be very appreciated, if this gets Concept ACKed.
ACKs for top commit:
kevkevinpal:
ACK [878d914](878d914777)
achow101:
ACK 878d914777
hebasto:
ACK 878d914777, I have reviewed the code and it looks OK.
pablomartin4btc:
tACK 878d914777
Tree-SHA512: 24513d493e47f572028c843260b81c47c2c29bfb701991050255c9f9529cd19065ecbc7b3b6e15619da7f3f608b4825c345ce6fee30d8fd1eaadbd08cff400fc
997b9a73e5 test: add assumeutxo wallet test (Sjors Provoost)
Pull request description:
Extracted from #28616, this adds a (very) basic wallet test for assume utxo. It checks some circumstances where a backup can and can't be loaded.
ACKs for top commit:
maflcko:
lgtm ACK 997b9a73e5
achow101:
ACK 997b9a73e5
theStack:
Code-review ACK 997b9a73e5
Tree-SHA512: 69474e56c6a46bb4f30fc54f8e5844766ac2a5f8226bb0b168d11ae1e3d4eae58570c1f1b4cc2b2f6f51b5d0e055bbe2bbd11684265215e01d4eb81ab4b7b0bb
